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Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax 
aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the 
employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large 
hand-collected dataset of U.S. firms’ political connections, we find that politically connected 
firms are more tax aggressive than non-connected firms, after controlling for other 
determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous 
choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political 
connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that 
politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of 
tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital 
market pressure for transparency, and greater risk-taking tendencies induced by political 
connections. 
 
JEL classification: D72; G34; H26 
Keywords: Political connection, tax avoidance, campaign contribution, lobbying 
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1. Introduction 
This study explores political connections as one potential determinant of corporate tax 
aggressiveness. The political economy literature shows that political connections are valuable 
resources to individual firms in both developing and developed countries and are important 
domestic arrangements affecting firms’ strategic choices (e.g., Faccio 2006; Goldman et al. 
2009; Guedhami et al. 2014; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006). 1  The impact of political 
connections on aggressive tax planning, however, is largely unknown in the academic 
literature. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) view tax avoidance as a continuum of tax planning 
strategies with perfectly legal and low-risk strategies at one end and something akin to tax 
evasion or tax sheltering at the other end. We are particularly interested in those tax 
avoidance strategies closer to the more aggressive end of the continuum because their 
determinants are the least understood (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Thus, we label our 
construct of interest tax aggressiveness or tax sheltering. We conjecture that politically 
connected firms are more tax aggressive because these firms can have lower detection risk, 
better information regarding future changes in tax regulation or enforcement, lower capital 
market pressure for transparency, lower political costs associated with aggressive tax 
planning, and higher risk-taking tendencies. We briefly discuss each of these reasons below. 
First, to the extent that politicians provide protection to connected firms, the detection 
risk of tax shelters can be lower, which leads to lower expected costs of tax sheltering. One 
may argue that career concerns can motivate federal employees to be less lenient toward 
connected firms (Fama 1980). For example, government officials may treat the tax planning 
activities of connected firms with extra caution to defend themselves against future 
accusations. While there is such a possibility, it does not rule out our conjecture. In fact, 
recent empirical evidence appears to be inconsistent with the career concern argument. For 
                                                       
1 Faccio (2006) and Guedhami et al. (2014) use international data, Goldman et al. (2009) use U.S. data, and 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) use Indonesian data. 
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example, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that connected firms in the United States receive 
more generous allocations of government capital but use the capital less efficiently than non-
connected firms. Hunter and Nelson (1995) and Young et al. (2001) find that political 
connections are negatively associated with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit 
rates of individual income tax returns. The recent IRS scandal over non-profit conservative 
groups being put under extra scrutiny also indicates that the IRS can be susceptible to 
political pressure. 
Second, political connections can help firms gain access to legislators in the United 
States (e.g., Hall and Wayman 1990; Milyo et al. 2000). This access can then provide 
connected firms with confidential information regarding future changes in tax laws or 
government resources allocated to tax enforcement (i.e., strictness of tax enforcement). 
Because of better information or less uncertainty, connected firms can better explore time-
series differences in tax laws or tax enforcement using complex tax strategies. As a result, we 
expect connected firms to be more tax aggressive than non-connected firms in the cross 
section.2 
Third, politically connected firms can afford more complicated and aggressive tax 
planning because they have less capital market pressure for transparency. Aggressive tax 
strategies can increase organizational complexity and reduce financial transparency, leading 
to higher financing costs (e.g., Balakrishnan et al. 2013; Hasan et al. 2014). However, prior 
research shows that politically connected firms have better access to debt capital than non-
connected firms do. For example, Houston et al. (2013) find that politically connected firms 
in the United States have lower bank loan costs and more so for firms with weaker bank 
monitoring, suggesting a substitution effect between creditor monitoring and political 
connections. As a result, managers of connected firms have less pressure to provide 
                                                       
2 We thank Mara Faccio and the reviewers for suggesting this mechanism. 
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transparent information to their creditors and thus they can worry less about the informational 
consequences of aggressive tax planning. In addition, preferential access to the debt market 
can alleviate equity market pressure for transparency because connected firms simply have 
less need for equity financing relative to non-connected firms.3 
Fourth, political connections can potentially reduce the political costs of being tax 
aggressive. Mills et al. (2012) find that U.S. firms relying more on government contracts pay 
more taxes, suggesting that these firms can suffer the cost of losing contract work for being 
tax aggressive. However, Goldman et al. (2013) find that political connections can increase 
the value of the procurement contracts of U.S. public firms, suggesting that connected firms 
worry less about losing government contracts.4 Therefore, politically connected firms can 
potentially afford more aggressive tax planning because their connections can alleviate the 
political cost concerns of being tax aggressive.5 
Finally, political connections can be associated with a higher degree of tax 
aggressiveness because of their impact on risk taking. Recent tax research argues that 
aggressive tax avoidance represents a kind of risky investment (e.g., Hanlon et al. 2014; 
Hutchens and Rego 2013; Rego and Wilson 2012). For example, Kim et al. (2011) show that 
aggressive tax planning is associated with higher stock price crash risk. Rego and Wilson 
(2012) find that managers’ risk-taking incentives are associated with greater tax 
aggressiveness. On the other hand, the political connection literature documents that 
politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out during times of economic distress 
in the United States and other countries (Duchin and Sosyura 2012; Faccio et al. 2006), 
implying that connected firms can afford more risky investments. Boubakri et al. (2013) find 
that political connections are positively associated with corporate risk taking for a sample of 
                                                       
3 This conjecture is likely to be true because of pecking order theory, according to which firms prefer to issue 
debt instead of equity when seeking external financing. In our U.S. sample, politically connected firms use 
significantly more financial leverage than non-connected firms do (Table 4). 
4 Our argument, however, is not limited to the political cost related to government contracts.  
5 We thank the reviewers for suggesting this mechanism. 
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international firms. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) argue that political connections serve as an 
insurance mechanism against extreme events. Thus, connected firms can engage in more 
risky tax planning because of their higher risk-taking tendencies induced by political 
connections. 
To conduct our empirical tests, we manually construct a new and comprehensive 
database of U.S. firms’ political connections. Specifically, for all firms in the 
Compustat/Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database from 1999 to 2009, we 
collect information regarding their employment of politically connected directors, their 
campaign contributions, and lobbying efforts from a variety of public sources. Then, we 
develop three indicators of political connections according to these three types of political 
activities. For additional tests, we construct several measures of the strength of political 
connections for the sample of firms that are politically connected. 
Given that our construct of interest is tax aggressiveness or tax sheltering, we choose 
the following proxies used by prior research: the discretionary permanent book–tax difference 
(DTAX), the tax shelter prediction score (SHELTER), and the inverse of industry-size adjusted 
effective tax rates (TA_ETR). Rego and Wilson (2012) use both DTAX and SHELTER to 
capture risky tax positions. Balakrishnan et al. (2013) develop the TA_ETR measure to proxy 
for overall tax planning aggressiveness. To address the potential measurement errors of each 
individual proxy, we also use principle component analysis to extract one principle factor 
from the above three measures. Finally, we use the amount of unrecognized tax benefits 
(UTBs) as an additional proxy for tax aggressiveness, recently made available by Financial 
Accounting Standard Board Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN48). Lisowsky et al. (2013) 
find that the ending balance of UTBs is positively and significantly associated with the usage 
of tax shelters, supporting UTBs as a reliable measure of tax sheltering. 
5 
 
After merging our political connection database with tax aggressiveness variables as 
well as other control variables, we obtain a sample of 32,898 firm–year observations over the 
period 1999 to 2009. To examine the relation between political connections and tax 
aggressiveness, we employ the Heckman two-stage model to mitigate the concern of the 
endogenous choice of establishing political ties. In the first-stage probit regression, we 
examine the determinants of a firm being politically connected. The first-stage results show 
that politically connected firms in the United States are generally larger, with higher financial 
leverage and more complex business operations. These findings are generally consistent with 
prior research using international data (e.g., Chaney et al. 2011; Faccio 2006). In addition, 
politically connected firms tend to be from more concentrated industries and industries that 
are more politically active. Finally, firms whose headquarters are geographically closer to 
Washington, D.C., are more likely to be politically active. 
From the results of the first-stage regressions, we calculate inverse Mills ratios and 
include them in the second-stage regressions. The second-stage results show strong evidence 
that politically connected firms are significantly more tax aggressive than their non-
politically connected counterparts, after controlling for other firm-level determinants of tax 
aggressiveness and industry and year fixed effects. Our results are consistent across all three 
measures of political connections and all four main measures of tax aggressiveness. In an 
event study, we also examine the effect of the nomination of a politically connected director 
on tax aggressiveness. Using a difference-in-differences regression with firm fixed effects, 
we find that the addition of politically connected directors increases the degree of tax 
aggressiveness. For a smaller sample of firm–year observations over 2007–2009, we also find 
that politically connected firms have significantly higher ending balances of UTBs. We also 
explore the variation in the strength of political connections within the sample of politically 
connected firms. Overall, we find evidence that the strength of political connections is 
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positively associated with the degree of tax aggressiveness. For example, we find that firms 
supporting more political candidates, firms with longer firm–candidate relationships, firms 
supporting more powerful candidates, firms with higher total lobbying expenditures, and 
firms with multiple political ties are generally more tax aggressive. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it contributes to the 
literature on the determinants of corporate tax aggressiveness. Recent research has examined 
the effect of ownership structure (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2010; Cheng et al. 
2012; McGuire et al. 2014), top executive incentives (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Rego 
and Wilson 2012), division/tax manager incentives (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2012; Phillips 
2003; Robinson et al. 2010), corporate governance (Armstrong et al. 2014; Minnick and 
Noga 2010), country-level characteristics and IRS monitoring (Atwood et al. 2012; Hoopes et 
al. 2012), auditor tax expertise (McGuire et al. 2012), individual manager characteristics 
(Dyreng et al. 2010), and stakeholder relationships (Cen et al. 2014; Chyz et al. 2013). Our 
study extends this line of research by identifying political connections as one significant 
factor that influences corporate tax aggressiveness. This finding is also interesting because 
politically connected firms represent a significant component of the U.S. economy: About 25 
percent of all public firms actively establish political connections through campaign 
contributions, lobbying, or hiring directors with political experience. A related study by 
Faccio (2010) examines, among other things, the association between political connections 
and effective tax rates for a sample of international firms from 47 countries. Our research 
differs by focusing on the aggressive tax planning of U.S. firms. 
Our research also contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of 
political connections. Prior studies find that political connections increase firm value.6 More 
recent research examines the channels through which political connections add value. Faccio 
                                                       
6 See Claessens et al. (2008), Faccio (2006), and Fisman (2001) for international evidence on the valuation 
implications of political connections. Also see Cooper et al. (2010) and Goldman et al. (2009) for U.S. evidence. 
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et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms around the world are more likely to be 
bailed out by the government during financial distress. Goldman et al. (2013) find that 
politically connected firms in the United States are more likely to obtain government 
procurement contracts. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) show that connected financial institutions 
in the United States were more likely to be funded by the government during the recent 
financial crisis. Our study adds to this literature by relating political connections to aggressive 
tax planning. Moreover, the use of a large and comprehensive dataset of U.S. firms’ political 
connections probably makes our study more generalizable than prior U.S. research. Our 
dataset can be useful for future works that investigate other intriguing aspects about the 
political connections of U.S. public firms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the measurement of key variables. Section 4 
presents the main empirical analysis. Section 5 presents additional analysis and several 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
In an important review of empirical tax research in accounting, Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001, 378) observe that “little is known about the potential cross-sectional differences in the 
willingness of firms to avoid taxes.” The authors thus call for more research on the 
determinants of tax aggressiveness. We have since observed significant developments in the 
tax avoidance literature. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Shevlin (2007) conduct updated 
and comprehensive reviews of the recent literature on tax avoidance. These reviews generally 
conclude that, although we have achieved some understanding of corporate tax planning 
activities, much remains to be done, especially regarding the determinants of aggressive tax 
planning or tax sheltering. 
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This study extends the literature by examining the association between corporate 
political connections and tax aggressiveness or tax sheltering. The political economy 
literature shows that political connections are valuable resources to individual firms (e.g., 
Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001; Goldman et al. 2009). Recent research also documents several 
channels through which political connections add value, including better treatment in the 
allocation of government contracts, preferential access to government capital investments, 
and preferential access to bank finance (e.g., Claessens et al. 2008; Duchin and Sosyura 2012; 
Faccio et al. 2006; Goldman et al. 2013). In this paper, we argue that politically connected 
firms are more tax aggressive because these firms can have lower detection risk, better 
information regarding future changes in tax regulation or enforcement, lower capital market 
pressure for transparency, lower political costs associated with aggressive tax planning, and 
higher risk-taking tendencies. 
Wilson (2009) finds that interests and penalties represent an economically significant 
cost to firms if the tax authorities successfully challenge the tax sheltering transactions. We 
argue that political connections can potentially lower the costs associated with the detection 
of tax sheltering by decreasing the probability of tax shelters being detected by regulators. 
Hunter and Nelson (1995) and Young et al. (2001) find that political connections are 
negatively associated with the IRS audit rates of individual income tax returns. Young et al. 
(2001, 201) conclude that “the IRS is not a rogue government agency, but rather is an 
effective bureaucratic agent of its political sponsors.” The survey-based evidence of Richter 
et al. (2009, 895) also suggests that “bureaucrats enforce the will of politicians who 
frequently make ‘status calls’ to them to ensure that the law is being enforced in ways the 
politicians see best meet the needs of their constituents.” Dean (2002) also argues that 
campaign contributions by Enron Corporation bought looser government oversight for the 
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firm’s egregious accounting and business practices. 7  Consistent with tax enforcement 
impacting managers’ incentives to avoid taxes, Hoopes et al. (2012) find that the IRS tax 
audit rate is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. Moreover, political 
connections can help firms to obtain critical information regarding future changes in tax 
codes or the strictness of tax enforcement, which can facilitate or motivate complex tax 
planning strategies. 
Balakrishnan et al. (2013) argue that aggressive tax planning strategies increase 
organizational complexity, which, in turn, can reduce financial transparency. Thus, financial 
opacity appears to be an important non-tax cost of aggressive tax planning. However, using a 
sample of firms from 19 countries, Chaney et al. (2011) find that politically connected firms 
face few adverse consequences from their lower-quality disclosures or financial opaqueness 
because of political pressure and intervention on their behalf in the capital market. One may 
argue that the findings of Chaney et al. (2011) may not generalize to the U.S. market. 
However, we note that U.S. firms actually represent a large proportion of the sample used by 
Chaney et al. (2011). Moreover, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that politically connected 
U.S. firms are more likely to receive government capital in situations of financial distress, 
suggesting that connected U.S. firms have lower default risk. Houston et al. (2013) find that 
political connections are associated with lower bank loan costs in the U.S. market, consistent 
with banks perceiving connected firms as having lower credit risk. Preferential access to bank 
loans can mitigate managers’ pressure to provide transparent financial information. Even if 
equity investors still have a demand for transparent financial information, the managers of 
connected firms have less need to respond to such demand, because connected firms can rely 
less on equity market financing relative to non-connected firms. This conjecture is somewhat 
                                                       
7 Note that the IRS is not the only party that provides potential oversight over corporate tax avoidance, given the 
complex nature of tax shelters and limited resources of the IRS. Other agencies, such as the Senate Finance 
Committee, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and the House Ways and Means Committee, 
are also actively involved in detecting aggressive tax avoidance.  
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intuitive, given pecking order theory, according to which firms prefer to issue debt rather than 
equity because the former is generally cheaper. In our sample of U.S. firms, connected firms 
use significantly more debt relative to non-connected firms, consistent with the cross-country 
findings of Faccio (2010). In fact, a growing body of asset pricing literature shows that equity 
investors also care about downside risk and can value the lower downside risk brought about 
by political connections (e.g., Ang et al. 2006; Conrad et al. 2013; Santa-Clara and Yan 2010; 
Yan 2011). For example, Boubakri et al. (2012) find that investors require a lower cost of 
equity for politically connected firms around the world. In sum, political connections can 
partially offset the opacity cost engendered by aggressive tax avoidance strategies, thereby 
increasing tax aggressiveness. 
In addition, increased protection against downside risk and reduced penalty on 
misbehavior can increase politically connected firms’ appetite for risk. Rego and Wilson 
(2012) argue that aggressive tax positions can be seen as a type of risky investment. The 
authors show that CEO equity risk incentives are associated with more aggressive tax 
planning. Kim et al. (2011) find that aggressive tax avoidance is related to higher downside 
risk in the future. Thus, political connections can increase managers’ risk-taking activities 
such as aggressive tax avoidance. Although not focusing on tax risk, Boubakri et al. (2013) 
find that political connections are positively associated with corporate risk taking. Finally, 
political connections can mitigate the political cost of being tax aggressive and thus increase 
tax aggressiveness. For example, Mills et al. (2012) find that the political cost of losing 
government contracts temper firms’ incentives to avoid taxes. Based on the discussion above, 
we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
HYPOTHESIS: Politically connected firms exhibit a different level of tax 
aggressiveness from that of their non-connected counterparts. 
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As discussed in Sections 1 and 3, our empirical tests examine a broad array of 
corporate political activities, including the employment of directors with a political 
background, campaign contributions, and lobbying. The employment of politicians as 
directors provides direct political ties and campaign contributions establish ties with 
politicians by supporting their election campaigns (Cooper et al. 2010; Faccio 2010). Thus, 
these two types of connections are somewhat similar and can affect tax aggressiveness 
through all the channels discussed above. 
On the other hand, lobbying activities are always issue specific instead of being 
focused on particular politicians. Several studies examine the effect of lobbying on effective 
tax rates. Their common argument is that corporations can lobby to obtain or maintain tax 
breaks, which leads to lower tax rates. For example, Richter et al. (2009) find that firms that 
spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates the next year. In 
contrast, Drope and Hansen (2008) find that firms that spend more in an effort to affect policy 
generally or tax policy specifically are no more likely to benefit from lower tax rates. Meade 
and Li (2012) show that firms that engage in aggressive lobbying instead of defensive 
lobbying exhibit a negative relation between the magnitude of tax lobbying expenditures and 
future tax rates. Brown et al. (2014) find that campaign contributions can enhance the 
effectiveness of lobbying in reducing effective tax rates. Overall, the evidence on lobbying 
and tax rates is somewhat mixed. While the above studies focus on tax codes that generally 
present at the industry level, our study focuses on the effect of political connections on the 
firm-level choices of aggressive tax arrangements, such as tax sheltering. Lobbying activities 
can potentially increase corporate tax aggressiveness by reducing regulatory oversight. For 
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example, Enron, one of the most politically connected firms in recent U.S. history, spent $3.5 
million in 1999 and 2000 on lobbying to influence oversight by regulatory authorities.8 
Because our motivation is to study the determinants of tax aggressiveness or tax 
sheltering, we use empirical measures that are designed to capture such constructs instead of 
using effective tax rates. However, to the extent that our empirical measures also capture 
some effects of favorable tax policies on politically connected firms, our findings should be 
interpreted with caveats.9 
 
3. Sample and measurements 
Sample and data 
The initial sample consists of firm–year observations from the intersection of Compustat and 
CRSP databases over the period of 1999 to 2009. Our sample period starts in 1999 because 
one of the indicators of political ties (i.e., lobbying efforts) only became available since the 
second half of 1998. We then delete observations with missing Compustat data needed to 
calculate our tax aggressiveness variables and control variables. We also exclude firm–year 
observations with negative book values and observations with total assets of less than 
$1 million. Firms from the financial services and utilities industries are also excluded. After 
merging the tax and control variables with our political connections database, we are left with 
a final sample of 32,898 firm–year observations.10 
Table 1 displays the annual and industry distributions of our research sample. Panel A 
of Table 1 shows an increasing trend in the number of politically connected firms over the 
                                                       
8 New York Times, Enron's Collapse: The Havens, January 17, 2002. 
9 In unreported tests, we find that all of our political connection measures are also associated with effective tax 
rates. However, further investigation suggests that aggressive tax planning plays an important role in the relation 
between political connections and effective tax rates. Moreover, we find that our main results hold even after the 
level of effective tax rates is included as an additional independent variable in the regression model. 
10 The sample size for one tax aggressiveness measure (i.e., TA_ETR) is smaller (N = 30,376) because of the 
additional requirement of three years of positive pre-tax income. All the results remain robust if we exclude 
observations with negative pre-tax income. Henry and Sansing (2014) show that discarding observations with 
negative pre-tax book income biases tax avoidance measures by treating income and loss years asymmetrically. 
Therefore, in our main tests, we include both profitable and loss firms. 
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sample period. On average, about 25 percent of our sample firms are politically connected, 
suggesting that political activism is relatively widespread in the United States. Panel B shows 
that the most politically active industries are coal, defense, and tobacco products, all of which 
have more than 50 percent politically connected firms. The least active industry is textiles, 
with only 8.1 percent connected firms. 
 
Political connection measures 
In this study, we develop a comprehensive dataset of corporate political connections. 
Specifically, we consider three types of corporate political activities: the employment of 
former politicians as corporate directors, corporate campaign contributions, and corporate 
lobbying expenditures. 
 
Political connections via the board of directors 
Using the EDGAR database, we manually extract the name and background of each board 
member for each firm–year observation from SEC filings, including DEF 14a, 10-K, and 8-
K. Following Goldman et al. (2009, Table 1), a company is defined as politically connected 
(PC_Director = 1) if it has at least one board member with one of the following former 
positions: president, presidential candidate, senator, member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, secretary, deputy secretary, deputy assistant secretary, undersecretary, 
associate director, governor, director (CIA, FEMA), deputy director (CIA, OMB), 
commissioner (IRS, NRC, SSA, CRC, FDA, SEC), representative to the United Nations, 
ambassador, staff (White House, president, presidential campaign), chairman of a party 
caucus, chairman or staff of a presidential election campaign, and chairman or member of a 
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presidential committee/council. Based on this definition, about 13.5 percent of all sample 
firms are politically connected.11 
 
Campaign contributions 
Our second measure of political connection is based on corporate campaign contributions. In 
the United States, firms can contribute to political campaigns indirectly by establishing and 
sponsoring political action committees (PACs). Our data on PAC contributions are collected 
from detailed committee and candidate summary contribution files from the Federal Election 
Commission.12 Following Cooper et al. (2010), we define a firm as politically connected in a 
year (PC_Contribution = 1) if it registered a PAC in November of that year. Approximately 
7.9 percent of our sample firms are politically connected according to this definition. 
 
Lobbying 
Lobbying refers to the act of attempting to influence the decisions made by government 
officials. While some companies host in-house lobbyists, most companies hire an external 
lobbying firm. We obtain lobbying data from the lobbying reports database maintained by the 
Senate Office of Public Records. Following Yu and Yu (2011), we define a firm to be 
politically connected (PC_Lobby = 1) in a given year if the firm incurs non-zero lobbying 
expenditures during the year. About 15 percent of our sample firms are politically connected 
according to their lobbying activities. 
                                                       
11 Goldman et al. (2009) document that 153 (30.6 percent) of the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500) firms were 
politically connected at the time of the 2000 election. In our data, we find 32 percent of the S&P 500 companies 
are connected. Our human tie-based political connections can understate firm connectedness because they do not 
incorporate cases where corporate directors become politicians. We also exclude local and lower-ranked 
politicians because these politicians are less influential. However, to the extent that local or lower-ranked 
politicians also have a significant influence on the IRS or firm-level policies, the effect of political connections 
can be underestimated. 
12 We do not consider “soft money” contributions (so-called super PACs) due to difficulties in data gathering 
and data reliability. 
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Tax aggressiveness/sheltering measures 
Our theories focus on aggressive tax positions or complicated tax shelters. Therefore, we 
choose measures of tax aggressiveness or tax sheltering developed by prior research. 
Following Armstrong et al. (2012) and Rego and Wilson (2012), our first two measures are 
discretionary permanent book–tax differences (DTAX) and a tax shelter prediction score 
(SHELTER). Prior research suggests that DTAX and SHELTER are significantly associated 
with actual cases of tax sheltering. Specifically, DTAX is the residual from the following 
regression, estimated by year and two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code: 
 
PERMDIFFit = ∝଴  + ∝ଵ  INTANit + ∝ଶ  UNCONit + ∝ଷ  MIit + ∝ସ CSTEit + ∝ହ	NOLit 
+∝଺LAGPERMit + eit,                     (1) 
 
where PERMDIFF is total book–tax difference minus the temporary book–tax difference, 
[{PI – [(TXFED +TXFO)/STR]} – (TXDI/STR)], scaled by lagged assets (AT); INTAN is 
goodwill and other intangible assets (INTAN), scaled by lagged assets; UNCON is income 
(loss) reported under the equity method (ESUB), scaled by lagged assets; MI is income (loss) 
attributable to minority interests (MII), scaled by lagged assets; CSTE is current state tax 
expense (TXS), scaled by lagged assets; NOL is change in net operating loss carryforwards 
(TLCF), scaled by lagged assets; LAGPERM is PERMDIFF in year t - 1; and STR is the 
statutory tax rate. 
The variable SHELTER is an indicator variable that takes the value one for firms in 
the top quintile of the predicted probability that the firm is engaged in tax sheltering, based 
on Wilson’s (2009) model: 
16 
 
 
SHELTER = -4.86 + 5.20 × BTD + 4.08 × DA – 1.41 × LEV + 0.76 × LAT + 3.51 × ROA + 
1.72 × FI + 2.43 × R&D,          (2) 
 
where BTD is the total book–tax difference, scaled by lagged total assets (AT); DA is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted modified cross-
sectional Jones model; LEV is long-term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT); LAT is the 
logarithm of total assets (AT); ROA is pre-tax earnings (PI) divided by lagged total assets; FI 
is an indicator variable equal to one for firm observations reporting foreign income (PIFO) 
and zero otherwise; and R&D is research and development (R&D) expenses (XRD) divided 
by lagged total assets.13 
The third measure of tax aggressiveness is constructed following Balakrishnan et al. 
(2013). Specifically, the measure TA_ETR is the industry- and size-matched GAAP ETR less 
the firm’s GAAP ETR,14 where GAAP ETR is the total tax expense over the past three years (t 
to t – 2) divided by the sum of pre-tax income over the past three years. Industry- and size-
matched GAAP ETR is the average GAAP ETR for the portfolio of firms in the same quintile 
of total assets and the same industry over the same time period. Positive values of TA_ETR 
imply that the firm pays less tax than its size and industry peers and greater values of TA_ETR 
indicate greater tax aggressiveness. 
All the above measures capture the underlying construct with errors. To mitigate the 
measurement errors of each individual measure, using principle component analysis, we 
develop a composite measure of tax aggressiveness (TA Factor) as the first principle 
component of the above three measures (e.g., Chen et al. 2010). Finally, in our robustness 
tests, we consider additional measures of tax avoidance, including the recently available 
                                                       
13 All the results are robust to the use of Lisowsky’s (2010) shelter measure. 
14 All the results hold if we replace total tax expense by total cash tax paid. 
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measure based on FIN48 UTBs. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and Table 3 
presents the correlation matrix for all the variables used in our main tests.15 Table 2 shows 
that most of the firm characteristics between connected firms and non-connected firms are 
significantly different. Table 3 shows that the three political connections proxies are 
positively correlated. In addition, all the tax aggressiveness measures are positively and 
significantly correlated with the political connections proxies, except that the correlation 
between PC_Contribution and TA_ETR is insignificant. 
 
4. Main empirical analysis 
In this section, we conduct an empirical analysis of the association between corporate 
political connections and tax aggressiveness. Firms choose whether to establish political 
connections or not. Thus, we employ a Heckman two-stage model to address the endogenous 
choices of corporate political connections. Toward this end, we first examine the 
determinants of corporate political activism in the United States. 
 
First-stage regressions: Determinants of corporate political activity 
In the first stage of the Heckman two-stage procedure, we examine the determinants of 
corporate political connections (PC) using the following probit regression: 
 
Pr൫ܲܥ௜,௧൯ ൌߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛܼ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ൫ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜,௧൯ ൅ ߠሺܻ݁ܽݎ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,   (3) 
 
where PC is one of the three political connection indicators (i.e., PC_Director, 
PC_Contribution, and PC_Lobby). The vector Xi,t represents the set of control variables in the 
second-stage regression. The vector ܼ௜,௧ represents additional selection model variables that 
                                                       
15 The Appendix provides detailed definitions for all the variables. 
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are potential determinants of political connections, from prior research on political 
connections (e.g., Chaney et al. 2011; Cooper et al. 2010). Lennox et al. (2012) argue that it is 
important to impose exclusion restrictions in implementing the Heckman two-stage 
regression (i.e., the treatment effect model), even though the inverse Mills ratio can be 
identified by its non-linear arguments. In other words, we need at least one variable in the 
first-stage model that affects tax aggressiveness only through its effects on political 
connections. Specifically, the vector ܼ௜,௧  includes Industry % of Connected Firms and 
Distance from Firm HQ to DC.16 Based on surveys of prior research on the determinants of 
corporate tax aggressiveness (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), we argue that there are no 
obvious economic reasons that these excluded variables have a direct impact on the level of 
corporate tax aggressiveness other than the indirect impact through political connections. For 
example, by construction, the variable Industry % of Connected Firms is positively related to 
the political connections of each individual firm within the industry. However, there is no 
clear reason to believe that industry political activeness has a direct impact on firm-level tax 
aggressiveness through channels other than political connections. Similar arguments can 
apply to the distance to DC variable. Table 3 shows that Industry % of Connected Firms and 
Distance from Firm HQ to DC have zero or very low correlations with the tax aggressiveness 
measures. 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Eq. (3). Consistent with prior research, we 
find that firm size is an important determinant of the likelihood of establishing connections. 
Politically connected firms also have higher leverage and are more complex than non-
connected firms (Cooper et al. 2010). Politically connected firms tend to come from more 
concentrated and more politically active industries. Finally, firms with headquarters closer to 
                                                       
16 The coefficients of our political connection variables in the second-stage regressions have the same 
significance levels if only one of the exclusion restrictions (i.e., Industry % of Connected Firms or Distance 
from Firm HQ to DC) is included in the first-stage model. 
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Washington, D.C., are more likely to establish political connections (Chaney et al. 2011). In 
Table 4, the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve ranges from 0.767 
to 0.901, depending on different political connection indicators. This suggests that our probit 
model has acceptable discriminatory power.17 Moreover, the Z variables are jointly significant 
(p < 0.00). Using the estimation results of Eq. (3), we construct inverse Mills ratios for each 
type of political connection and incorporate these ratios in the second-stage regressions. 
 
Second-stage regressions: Political connections and tax aggressiveness 
To examine the relation between political connections and tax aggressiveness, we estimate 
the following second-stage regression: 
 
ܶܣ ௜ܺ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܲܥ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߮ܯ݈݈݅ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ൫ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜,௧൯ ൅ ߠሺܻ݁ܽݎ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,  (4) 
 
where TAX is one of the four tax aggressiveness proxies (i.e., DTAX, SHELTER, TA_ETR, and 
TA Factor) and PC is one of the three measures of political connections, as defined in Section 
3. If politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than non-connected firms, we expect 
ߚ to be significantly positive. The detailed definitions for all control variables are presented 
in the Appendix. 
The set of control variables is taken from prior research (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2012; 
Chen et al. 2010; Rego and Wilson 2012). We control for return on assets (ROA), loss 
carryforwards, and changes in loss carryforwards because prior research finds that operating 
performance impacts a firm’s need to avoid taxes. We include standard deviations of ROA 
because variation in profitability may impact a firm’s tax planning strategies (Armstrong et 
                                                       
17 The proper statistic with which to measure the power of a logit/probit model is the area under the ROC curve 
instead of the pseudo-R2 value. An area under the ROC curve of more than 80% is generally considered very 
good or excellent. 
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al. 2012; Rego and Wilson 2012). We include foreign assets to control for differences in 
international tax planning opportunities (Rego 2003). We include change in goodwill to 
capture the potential impact of merger and acquisition activities. New investments and 
property, plant, and equipment balance are included to control for a firm’s investment 
activity, since investment can lead to book–tax differences because of different tax and 
accounting rules. Following Chen et al. (2010), we include intangible assets and equity 
income in earnings to control for differential book and tax treatments of intangibles and 
consolidated earnings accounted for using the equity method. We control for abnormal 
accruals because Frank et al. (2009) find a positive association between financial and tax 
reporting aggressiveness. Cash is included to account for a firm’s cash needs that may 
motivate tax deferral strategies (McGuire et al. 2012). Firm size, leverage, and market-to-
book ratios are included to make sure our results are robust to these commonly used control 
variables. Complex organization structure can give firms more opportunities for aggressive 
tax planning (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2012). We control for the complexity of the organization 
using the number of business and geographic segments. McGuire et al. (2014) find that dual-
class firms engage in lower levels of tax planning and thus we include a dual-class firm 
indicator in the regression. In addition, we include a governance index and institutional 
ownership to further control for the effect of governance. Mills et al. (2012) find that firms 
with more government procurement contracts pay higher taxes. To control for this effect, we 
include the logarithm of the total dollar amount of government contracts in the regression. 
Finally, we control for industry-level competition. It is possible that firms from more 
competitive industries have a greater demand for tax aggressiveness. On the other hand, high 
competition represents a strong external governance mechanism and can thus reduce extreme 
forms of tax avoidance (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2014). In all specifications, we include industry 
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and year fixed effects. The inverse Mills ratios constructed using the results in Table 4 are 
included to control for the endogenous choice of political connections. 
Table 5 reports the second-stage regression results. For all regression specifications, 
the t-statistics below the coefficients are based on standard errors corrected for firm and year 
clustering (Petersen 2009). Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of the association between 
PC_Director and tax aggressiveness. Each column of Panel A reports the regression results 
with each of the four tax aggressiveness measures as the dependent variable. Panel A shows 
that PC_Director is positively and significantly associated with DTAX, SHELTER, TA_ETR, 
and the tax aggressiveness factor. These results indicate that the presence of former 
politicians as directors is related to higher levels of tax aggressiveness or tax shelter usage. 
The results are also economically significant. For example, the result in column (4) of Panel 
A suggests that politically connected firms have a level of tax aggressiveness more than one 
standard deviation higher than that of non-connected firms. The coefficients of the control 
variables are generally consistent with prior research. For example, Table 5, Panel A, shows 
that ROA, loss carryforwards, and foreign assets are positively associated with the level of 
tax aggressiveness. The coefficient of the dual-class indicator is overall negative, consistent 
with McGuire et al. (2014). On the other hand, the coefficient of governance index is overall 
positive and significant, suggesting that firms with more anti-takeover provisions are more 
aggressive in tax planning. The coefficient of government contracts is significantly negative 
in the TA_ETR and tax aggressiveness factor regressions. The coefficients of the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index is negative and significant, suggesting that firms in more competitive 
industries are more tax aggressive. The coefficients of the other control variables are 
generally inconsistent across different measures of tax aggressiveness. For example, size is 
negatively related to tax aggressiveness when DTAX is the dependent variable, which is 
somewhat consistent with the political cost hypothesis (Zimmerman 1983). However, the 
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relation is positive when SHELTER, TA_ETR, or the tax aggressiveness factor is used to 
measure tax aggressiveness. The coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are all significantly 
negative, suggesting that ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions likely bias the coefficient 
estimates downward. Supporting this interpretation, untabulated results show that the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of PC_Director estimated by OLS regressions are significantly 
lower than those from the treatment effect models. A caveat here is that the treatment effect 
model results are better than the OLS regression results only if at least one of the excluded 
variables is valid. Nevertheless, we find that PC_Director is still positively associated with 
all tax aggressiveness measures at better than the one percent level, even in OLS regressions. 
Table 5, Panel B, reports the results using PC_Contribution as the key independent 
variable of interest and Panel C reports the results using PC_Lobby as the key independent 
variable of interest. Both measures of political connections are also significantly and 
positively associated with all four measures of tax aggressiveness, suggesting that campaign-
contributing firms and lobbying firms engage in more aggressive tax planning. Again, the 
coefficients of PC_Contribution and PC_Lobby are positive and significant at the one percent 
level in OLS regressions, although with significantly smaller magnitudes. 
Overall, the results in Table 5 support the prediction that political connections are 
positively associated with the extent of aggressive tax planning, probably due to the 
mitigating effect of political connections on the cost of aggressive and complicated tax 
strategies. The empirical results are obtained after controlling for many other determinants of 
tax aggressiveness and industry and year fixed effects, as well as the endogenous choice of 
political connections. 
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5. Additional analysis and robustness checks 
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks and present additional analysis on the 
strength of political connections. 
 
Reverse causality, omitted variables, and a firm fixed effect method 
Both tax aggressiveness and political connections are firm choices. Some unknown factors 
can drive both tax planning policies and corporate political activities. Moreover, past 
aggressive tax positions can motivate firms to seek political connections.18 To address these 
issues, we include a battery of control variables that are potential determinants of tax 
aggressiveness. In addition, we explicitly address the potential endogenous choice of political 
connections by using the Heckman two-stage model (e.g., Lennox et al. 2012). 
To further address the endogeneity issue, in this subsection we include firm fixed 
effects in the second-stage regression. Due to the largely time-invariant nature of the political 
connection variables, it is inappropriate to use a traditional fixed effect method because this 
method depends on within-firm variations (Roberts and Whited 2012).19 Instead, we follow 
the method of Aghion et al. (2013) to explore the time series of tax avoidance data available 
before the sample period. Specifically, we first calculate the firm-specific means of the 
dependent variable (i.e., the four tax aggressiveness measures) during the pre-sample period 
1994 to 1998.20  Then, we include the pre-sample firm-specific means of the dependent 
variable (i.e., the firm fixed effects) as an additional control variable in the second-stage 
regression. The results reported in Table 5 are robust to controlling for past tax 
aggressiveness, alleviating the reverse causality concern that tax-aggressive firms forge 
political ties to mitigate the costs stemming from tax aggressiveness (untabulated). 
                                                       
18 However, it is also possible that politicians are less willing to join firms with aggressive tax positions.  
19 As expected, the political connection variables generally load insignificantly in the fixed effect regressions. 
20 The year 1994 is the first year in which we can have consistent tax avoidance variables due to a tax rate 
change in 1993. 
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To maximize within-firm variations and better implement the traditional firm fixed 
effect model, we next examine the effect of nominating politically connected directors. 
Goldman et al. (2009) show that these nominations are largely driven by the supply of 
connected directors rather than the demand for them. This is because individuals who are 
both willing and able to use their political connections to help a company are in limited 
supply. Therefore, reverse causality is unlikely to be an issue for director-based political 
connections. To conduct an event study, we first identify a sample of 1,884 newly nominated 
politically connected directors during the period 1999 to 2009. We then apply the following 
criteria: i) The connected director stays with the firm for at least three years after his/her 
nomination, ii) the firm had no political connections before the director nomination, and 
iii) multiple nominations in the same year for the same firm are counted as one event. After 
applying these criteria, we are left with 289 unique firms with connected director 
nominations. To examine the effect of connected director nominations, we run the following 
difference-in-differences regression: 
 
 ܶܣ ௜ܺ,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߚܱܲܵܶ_ܣܦܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,       (5) 
 
where TAX is one of the four tax aggressiveness proxies, αi is a firm fixed effect, τi is a time 
indicator, POST_ADD is the interaction term between POST and ADD, ADD is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one for firms that appoint politically connected directors and 
zero otherwise, POST is an indicator that takes the value of one for ADD firms for the period 
after the appointment year and zero otherwise, and Xi,t is the set of control variables in Eq. 
(4).21 For each event firm with a connected director nomination, we include two years of 
                                                       
21 The indicators ADD and Dual Class are omitted from the regression model because of the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects. The results are stronger if we exclude firm fixed effects. 
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observations before the event year and two years of observations after it.22 The control firms 
are all firms that had no political connections of any type throughout the sample period. 
Table 6 reports the results of the difference-in-differences regression. We can see that 
the coefficient of POST_ADD is positive and significant for all tax aggressiveness proxies. 
These results suggest that the addition of politically connected directors leads to an increased 
level of tax aggressiveness. More importantly, because firm fixed effects (as well as a battery 
of other control variables) are controlled for, the results are unlikely to be driven solely by 
omitted variables. Overall, the results in this section partially address the issue of omitted 
variables and reverse causality. However, we admit that our empirical strategies are unlikely 
to completely solve the endogeneity issue and readers should take caution in interpreting our 
results as evidence that political connections have a causal effect on tax aggressiveness. 
 
UTB analysis 
In 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued FIN48, Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes, which requires firms to provide additional disclosures about 
levels and changes in UTBs. Recent research claims that the FIN48 UTB is theoretically most 
similar to the underlying construct of tax aggressiveness relative to other publicly available 
data (Rego and Wilson 2012). Using IRS confidential tax shelter data, Lisowsky et al. (2013) 
provide empirical support for this claim by documenting a strong and robust association 
between the ending balance of total UTBs and tax shelter participation. 
Following the suggestions of Lisowsky et al. (2013), we construct a measure of tax 
aggressiveness using Compustat data item “TXTUBEND” (i.e., the ending balance of UTBs). 
Specifically, the variable lnUTB is the natural logarithm of TXTUBEND. Larger firms are 
likely to have larger reserves for UTBs. Therefore, we also calculate a measure scaled by 
                                                       
22 The observation for the year of nomination is excluded. 
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total assets, SC_UTB. We note, however, that Lisowsky et al. (2013) document a much 
stronger predicting power of lnUTB for tax shelter participation than of SC_UTB, even after 
controlling for firm size. 
Using a sample of 4,426 firms during 2007 to 2009, we re-estimate Eq. (4) using the 
UTB measures as the dependent variable and report the results in Table 7. Column (1) of 
Table 7 shows that all three measures of political connections are positively and significantly 
associated with the UTB levels, as measured by lnUTB. Column (2) shows that the results are 
weaker when using SC_UTB. 
Rego and Wilson (2012) also use the predicted level of UTBs as a measure of tax 
aggressiveness. Using the coefficients in Table 1 of Rego and Wilson (2012), we estimate the 
predicted levels of UTB for our broad sample firms as 
 
Pred_UTB = -0.004+0.011*PT_ROA + 0.001*SIZE + 0.010*FOR_SALE + 0.092*R&D – 
0.002*DISC_ACCR – 0.003*LEV + 0.000*MTB + 0.014*SG&A – 0.018*SALES_GR, 
           (6) 
where PT_ROA is pre-tax earnings (PI) divided by lagged total assets; SIZE is the logarithm 
of total assets (AT); FOR_SALE is total foreign sales scaled by total sales; R&D is R&D 
expenses (XRD) divided by lagged total assets; DISC_ACCR is discretionary accruals from 
the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model; LEV is long-term debt 
(DLTT) divided by total assets (AT); MTB is the market-to-book ratio; SG&A is selling, 
general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) expenses (XSGA) scaled by lagged total 
assets; and SALES_GR is the net sales growth rate. 
Column (3) of Table 7 reports the results of estimating Eq. (4) using the predicted 
UTB as the dependent variable. As seen in column (3), the coefficients of all the measures of 
political connections are significantly positive. Overall, the results in this section show that 
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the relation between political connections and tax aggressiveness is robust to the use of UTBs 
to measure tax aggressiveness. 
 
Strength of connections 
In this section, we further explore whether the strength of political connections is associated 
with the extent of tax aggressiveness for the subsample of connected firms. To do this, we 
replace the political connection indicator in Eq. (4) with one of the measures of political 
connection strength. For political connections through directorship, we construct a measure, 
Director_freshness, which is defined as one divided by one plus the elapsed years between 
the current year and that of the most recent political position held by any connected 
directors. 23  Higher values of Director_freshness indicate more recent positions and thus 
stronger connections. For example, Director_freshness is one if the firm has a director who 
holds a position in the current year. 
Second, following Cooper et al. (2010), we create several contribution indexes for the 
sample of firms that make political contributions. These indexes include the logarithm of the 
total number of candidates supported over a rolling five-year window (PICandidates); the 
weighted sum of the number of months during which a firm has maintained an uninterrupted 
relationship with each supported candidate (PIStrength), where uninterrupted relationships are 
taken to be those in which the firm did not miss any of the candidate’s past reelection cycles; 
the ability of a candidate to help a firm (PIAbility); and the weighted number of the total 
number of candidates supported(PIPower), where the weight for each candidate is the sum of 
the candidate’s committee rankings. The Appendix provides detailed construction procedures 
for each of the indexes.24 
                                                       
23 It may be intuitive to measure strength by the number of connected directors; however, for most firms in our 
sample, there is only one connected director and thus we have little variation for empirical tests. 
24 See Cooper et al. (2010) for more detailed descriptions of the construction of the above contribution indexes. 
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Finally, we measure connection strength using the logarithm of total lobbying 
expenditures during the year for the sample of firm–years engaging in lobbying activities. 
Table 8 presents the results for connection strength. Overall, we find some weak evidence 
regarding the relation between the measures of political connection strength and the level of 
tax aggressiveness.25 For example, Table 8 shows that firms supporting more candidates 
through campaign contributions, firms with longer firm–candidate relationships, firms 
supporting more powerful candidates, and firms with higher total lobbying expenditures 
appear to be marginally more tax aggressive. In addition, we measure the strength of political 
connections by the number of political connection types. Panel G of Table 8 shows that firms 
with all three types of connections (i.e., connected directors, campaign contributions, and 
lobbying) have a greater degree of tax aggressiveness than firms with one or two types of 
connections and that firms with two types of connections have a greater degree of tax 
avoidance than firms with only one type of connection. These results suggest that different 
types of political connections are likely to be complements of each other rather than pure 
substitutes.26 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax 
aggressiveness. We manually construct a large dataset of U.S. firms’ political activities during 
the period 1999 to 2009, including the employment of former politicians as directors, 
corporate campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a Heckman two-stage model to 
mitigate self-selection bias, we find strong evidence that corporate political connections are 
associated with higher levels of tax aggressiveness. The results are consistent across different 
                                                       
25 The coefficients of connection strength variables have the same significance levels in OLS regressions. 
26 We also extract a common factor from the three types of political connections and find that this common 
factor is positively and significantly related to tax aggressiveness. This suggests that the three types of 
connections have something in common, although they are not pure substitutes. Moreover, we find no evidence 
that some types of connections are more strongly related to tax aggressiveness than others. 
29 
 
measures of tax aggressiveness and different types of political connections. In addition, using 
an event study approach with firm fixed effects, we find that the nomination of politically 
connected directors increases the degree of tax aggressiveness. We offer several potential 
interpretations for the positive relation between political connections and tax aggressiveness, 
including lower detection risk, better information regarding tax regulation and enforcement, 
lower capital market pressure for transparency, lower political costs of aggressive tax 
planning, and greater risk-taking tendencies for politically connected firms. However, we 
acknowledge that our research is largely explorative in nature and we leave the empirical 
investigation of the underlying mechanisms for future research. For example, one interesting 
research question could be whether the IRS is less likely to target politically connected firms. 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
 
Key Tax Variables  
DTAX The discretionary permanent book–tax difference of Frank et al. (2009), 
which is the residual from the following regression, estimated by year and 
two-digit SIC code:  
 
PERMDIFFit = ∝଴ + ∝ଵ INTANit + ∝ଶ UNCONit + ∝ଷ MIit + ∝ସCSTEit 
+∝ହ	NOLit +∝଺ LAGPERMit + eit,  
 
where PERMDIFF = total book–tax difference – temporary book–tax 
difference = [{PI – [(TXFED +TXFO) / STR]} – (TXDI / STR)], scaled by 
lagged assets (AT); INTAN = goodwill and other intangible assets (INTAN), 
scaled by lagged assets; UNCON = income (loss) reported under the equity 
method (ESUB), scaled by lagged assets; MI = income (loss) attributable to 
minority interest (MII), scaled by lagged assets; CSTE = current state tax 
expense (TXS), scaled by lagged assets; NOL = change in net operating loss 
carryforwards (TLCF), scaled by lagged assets; LAGPERM = PERMDIFF in 
year t - 1; and STR is the statutory tax rate. 
 
SHELTER An indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms in the top quintile of 
the predicted probability that the firm is engaged in tax sheltering, based on 
Wilson’s (2009) model: 
 
SHELTER = -4.86 + 5.20 × BTD + 4.08 × DA - 1.41 × LEV + 0.76 × LAT + 
3.51 × ROA + 1.72 × FI + 2.43 × R&D,  
 
where BTD is the total book–tax difference, scaled by lagged total assets (AT), 
DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals from the performance-
adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model, LEV is long-term debt (DLTT) 
divided by total assets (AT), LAT is the logarithm of total assets (AT), ROA is 
pre-tax earnings (PI) divided by lagged total assets, FI is an indicator variable 
equal to one for firm observations reporting foreign income (PIFO) and zero 
otherwise, and R&D is R&D expenses (XRD) divided by lagged total assets. 
 
TA_ETR The tax aggressiveness measure of Balakrishnan et al. (2013), which is the 
firm’s mean industry- and size-matched GAAP_ETR less the firm’s 
GAAP_ETR, where GAAP_ETR is the sum of total tax expenses (TXT) over 
years t, t - 1 and t - 2, divided by the sum of pre-tax income (PI) over years t, 
t - 1 and t - 2. The mean industry- and size-matched GAAP_ETR is the mean 
GAAP_ETR for the portfolio of firms in the same quintile of total assets and 
the same industry as the firm, where size and industry are sorted 
independently and industry is based on the Fama-French 48 industries. Note 
that higher values of TA_ETR indicate greater tax aggressiveness. 
 
TA Factor  The first principal component of the above three tax aggressiveness measures. 
 
Key Political Connection 
Variables 
 
PC_Director An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm has at least one former 
politician on board, zero otherwise. 
PC_Contribution An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm has non-zero campaign 
contributions, zero otherwise. 
PC_Lobby An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm has non-zero lobby 
expenses, zero otherwise. 
 
Control variables 
 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as pre-tax income (PI) divided by lagged total 
assets (AT). 
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Std. Dev. of ROA Standard deviation of ROA over the past five years. 
Loss Carryforward An indicator variable that equals one if net operating loss carryforwards is 
positive (Compustat: TLCF). 
Change in Loss 
Carryforward 
Change in net operating loss carryforwards (Compustat TLCF) scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT).  
Foreign Assets Foreign assets, estimated following Oler et al. (2007).
Change in Goodwill Change in goodwill (GDWL) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). If the value is 
negative, then it is set to zero. 
New Investments New investment, calculated as Compustat (XRD + CAPX + AQC - SPPE -
DPC), scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
Property, Plant, and 
Equipment 
Net property, plant, and equipment at the end the year, calculated as 
Compustat PPENT scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
Intangible Assets Intangible assets at the end of the year, calculated as Compustat INTAN scaled 
by lagged total assets (AT). If INTAN = ‘C’, then INTAN = GDWL. 
Equity Income in 
Earnings 
Equity income in earnings, calculated as Compustat ESUB scaled by lagged 
total assets (AT). 
Abnormal Accruals The absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated from the performance-
adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model. 
Cash Holdings Cash holdings at the end of the year, calculated as Compustat CHE scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT).  
Firm Size Log of market value of equity at the end of the year, calculated as Compustat 
PRCC_F ×CSHO. 
Leverage Financial leverage at the end of the year, calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) 
scaled by total assets (AT). 
Market-to-Book Market-to-book ratio at the end of the year, calculated as the market value of 
equity (Compustat PRCC_F ×CSHO) divided by the book value of equity 
(Compustat CEQ). 
No. of Business Segments Log of the number of business segments. 
No. of Geographic 
Segments 
Log of the number of geographic segments. 
Governance Index The governance index of Gompers et al. (2003), where higher values indicate 
more anti-takeover provisions and weaker monitoring and governance. 
Missing values are replaced by the sample median in the main regressions. 
Institutional Ownership The average percentage of shares held by institutional investors over year t 
(Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum database). 
Dual Class An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm has more than one class of 
stocks and zero otherwise. 
Government Contracts The natural logarithm of the dollar amount of government procurement 
contracts of the firm. 
Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index 
The Herfindahl index of industry concentration computed with firm net sales. 
 
Selection model variables 
 
Industry % of Connected 
Firms 
The percentage of politically connected firms in a firm’s industry group. 
Distance from Firm HQ to 
DC 
Log of the distance (in kilometers) from a firm’s headquarters to the White 
House. 
 
Additional test variables 
 
Director_Freshness One divided by one plus the elapsed years between the current year and the 
most recent political position held by any connected directors. It takes a value 
between zero and one. It is one if the firm has political connections in the 
current year (no elapsed year). It is set to zero if the relevant information is 
missing for a politically connected firm. 
PICandidates PI_Candidates ൌ ∑ ܥܽ݊ ௝݀௧,௧ିହ௃௝ୀଵ , 
where Candjt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has made hard 
money contributions to candidate j over the years t - 5 to t (for details, see 
Cooper et al. 2010). 
PIStrength PI_Strength ൌ ∑ Cand୨୲,୲ିହ ൈ ܫ௝௧ ൈ ே஼௏ೕ೟ேை௏ೕ೟ ൈ ݎ݈݈݁݁݊݃ݐ ௝݄௧,௧ିହ
୎
୨ୀଵ , 
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where Ijt is an indicator variable equal to one if candidate j is in office as of 
October of year t and zero otherwise, NCVjt is the number of House or Senate 
votes that candidate j’s party holds in office at time t, NOVjt is the number of 
votes that candidate j’s opposing party holds in office in the House or the 
Senate at time t, and rellengthjt is the number of months during which firm i 
has maintained an uninterrupted relationship with candidate j until time t. The 
ratio 
ே஼௏ೕ೟
ேை௏ೕ೟ captures the political strength of candidate j’s party relative to that 
of the opposition party, reflecting the notion that firm–politician relationships 
becomes stronger (weaker) for politicians affiliated with the controlling 
(opposing) party (for details, see Cooper et al. 2010). 
PIAbility PI_Ability ൌ ∑ HomeCand୨୲,୲ିହ ൈ I୨୲ ൈ ୒େ୚ౠ౪୒୓୚ౠ౪
୎
୨ୀଵ , 
where HomeCandidatejt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if candidate j is 
running for office in the state in which firm I’s headquarters are located and 
zero otherwise (for details, see Cooper et al. 2010). 
PIPower PI_Power ൌ ∑ Cand୨୲,୲ିହ ൈ ܫ௝௧ ൈ ே஼௏ೕ೟ேை௏ೕ೟ ൈ ቂ∑
஼௢௠௠௜௧௧௘௘	௥௔௡௞೘೟
ெ௘ௗ௜௔௡ ௖௢௠௠௜௧௧௘௘	௥௔௡௞೘೟
ெ௠ୀଵ ቃ௝
୎
୨ୀଵ , 
where Committee rankmt is the reciprocal of candidate j’s rank on committee 
m (where rank = 1 for the most important member, rank = 2 for the next 
important member and so on, largely based on seniority) and Median 
committee rankmt is the median number of members on a given committee m 
over the past five years of which candidate j is a member. The ratio 
஼௢௠௠௜௧௧௘௘	௥௔௡௞೘೟
ெ௘ௗ௜௔௡	௖௢௠௠௜௧௧௘௘	௥௔௡௞೘೟ measures the political power of the politician in the 
committee, deflated by the median size of the committee, incorporating the 
notion that the committee chair or elected congressmen with higher seniority 
on the committee are more powerful politicians and that the power of each 
member is weaker when the size of the committee is larger (i.e., the dilution 
effect). 
Lobby Amount The natural logarithm of the total amount paid to lobbyists. 
PC_3 An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm is connected through all 
three types of connections (i.e., director, contribution, and lobbying). 
PC_2 An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm is connected through two 
out of three types of connections.
PC_1 An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm is connected through only 
one of the three types of connections. 
lnUTB UTBs, calculated as log(1 + TXTUBEND).
SC_UTB  Scaled UTBs, calculated as (TXTUBEND/AT). 
Pred_UTB Predicted level of UTB following the method of Rego and Wilson (2012): 
Pred_UTB = -0.004+0.011*PT_ROA + 0.001*SIZE + 0.010*FOR_ SALE + 
0.092*R&D - 0.002*DISC_ACCR - 0.003*LEV + 0.000*MTB + 0.014*SG&A 
- 0.018*SALES_GR, 
where PT_ROA is pre-tax earnings (PI) divided by lagged total assets, SIZE is 
the log of total assets (AT), FOR_SALE is total foreign sales scaled by total 
sales, R&D is R&D expenses (XRD) divided by lagged total assets, 
DISC_ACCR is discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted 
modified cross-sectional Jones model, LEV is long-term debt (DLTT) divided 
by total assets (AT), MTB is the market-to-book ratio, SG&A is SG&A 
expenses (XSGA) scaled by lagged total assets, and SALES_GR is net sales 
growth rate. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample distribution 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year 
Fiscal year Connected firms 
Non-connected 
firms All firms 
Percentage of 
connected firms 
     
1999 665 2,745 3,410 19.5% 
2000 672 2,602 3,274 20.5% 
2001 681 2,517 3,198 21.3%
2002 740 2,459 3,199 23.1% 
2003 802 2,414 3,216 24.9% 
2004 824 2,293 3,117 26.4% 
2005 827 2,157 2,984 27.7% 
2006 791 2,001 2,792 28.3%
2007 752 1,905 2,657 28.3% 
2008 739 1,808 2,547 29.0% 
2009 715 1,789 2,504 28.6% 
     
Total 8,208 24,690 32,898 24.9%
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by Fama–French industries 
Industry 
Connected 
firm–years 
Non-connected 
firm–years All firm–years 
Percentage of 
connected firms 
     
Agriculture 32 109 141 22.7% 
Aircraft 81 111 192 42.2% 
Alcoholic Beverages 62 77 139 44.6% 
Apparel 87 517 604 14.4% 
Automobiles and Trucks 184 309 493 37.3% 
Business Services 1,005 3,776 4,781 21.0% 
Business Supplies 145 314 459 31.6% 
Candy and Soda 37 44 81 45.7%
Chemicals 279 420 699 39.9% 
Coal 52 9 61 85.2% 
Computers 367 1,254 1,621 22.6% 
Construction 111 283 394 28.2% 
Construction Materials 185 511 696 26.6%
Consumer Goods 169 401 570 29.6% 
Defense 55 38 93 59.1% 
Electrical Equipment 113 355 468 24.1% 
Electronic Equipment 455 2,221 2,676 17.0% 
Entertainment 177 312 489 36.2%
Fabricated Products 23 92 115 20.0% 
Food Products 203 439 642 31.6% 
Healthcare 240 448 688 34.9% 
Machinery 268 1,110 1,378 19.4% 
Measuring and Control Equip. 141 872 1,013 13.9%
Medical Equipment 320 1,139 1,459 21.9% 
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Miscellaneous 137 416 553 24.8% 
Nonmetallic Mines 46 69 115 40.0% 
Personal Services 122 285 407 30.0% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 477 1,074 1,551 30.8% 
Pharmaceutical Products 701 1,564 2,265 30.9% 
Precious Metals 32 37 69 46.4% 
Printing and Publishing 98 158 256 38.3% 
Recreational Products 54 256 310 17.4% 
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 134 636 770 17.4% 
Retail 383 1,753 2,136 17.9% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 73 240 313 23.3% 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq. 31 38 69 44.9% 
Shipping Containers 30 52 82 36.6% 
Steel Works, etc. 132 377 509 25.9% 
Telecommunications 340 651 991 34.3% 
Textiles 12 137 149 8.1% 
Tobacco Products 27 0 27 100.0% 
Transportation 391 592 983 39.8% 
Wholesale 197 1,194 1,391 14.2% 
     
Total 8,208 24,690 32,898 24.9% 
 
Notes: 
a Here, politically connected firms (firm–years) are defined as those firms (firm–years) that engage in at least 
one of the following three activities: employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
 
 
 Connected firm–years  Non-connected firm–years 
Mean Median Mean Median 
DTAX 0.000 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002***
SHELTER 0.440 0.000  0.126*** 0.000*** 
TA_ETR 0.018 0.034  -0.001*** 0.029*** 
TA Factor 0.170 0.110  0.042*** 0.036*** 
PC_Director 0.540 1.000  0.000*** 0.000*** 
PC_Contribution 0.316 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
PC_Lobby 0.596 1.000  0.000*** 0.000*** 
ROA 0.038 0.067  -0.007*** 0.039*** 
Std. Dev. of ROA 0.091 0.054  0.122*** 0.078*** 
Loss Carryforward 0.383 0.000  0.391 0.000*** 
Change in Loss Carryforward 0.023 0.000 0.039*** 0.000
Foreign Assets 0.232 0.135  0.200*** 0.003*** 
Change in Goodwill 0.024 0.000  0.020*** 0.000*** 
New Investments 0.087 0.040  0.095*** 0.045 
Property, Plant, and Equipment 0.307 0.220 0.266*** 0.177***
Intangible Assets 0.198 0.120 0.154*** 0.063***
Equity Income in Earnings 0.001 0.000  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Abnormal Accruals 0.063 0.039  0.079*** 0.051*** 
Cash Holdings 0.186 0.088  0.235*** 0.127*** 
Firm Size 7.229 7.284 5.162*** 5.169***
Leverage 0.187 0.167 0.140*** 0.070***
Market-to-Book 3.421 2.345  2.858*** 1.845*** 
No. of Business Segments 1.843 1.946  1.659*** 1.386*** 
No. of Geographic Segments 1.864 1.946  1.694*** 1.386*** 
Governance Index 9.218 9.000 8.904*** 9.000***
Institutional Ownership 0.551 0.632  0.407*** 0.346*** 
Dual Class 0.143 0.000  0.090*** 0.000*** 
Government Contracts 1.121 0.041  0.275*** 0.000*** 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 0.077 0.057  0.070*** 0.054*** 
Industry % of Connected Firms 0.179 0.168 0.152*** 0.144***
Distance from Firm HQ to DC 4.787 5.017  4.820*** 4.951** 
 
Notes: 
a All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
The superscripts *** and * indicate significant mean/median differences between connected and non-connected 
firms at the 0.01and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations 
 
Variables ID A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 
DTAX A 0.11 -0.11 0.57 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.52 -0.18 -0.01 -0.19 0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.04 
SHELTER B 0.10 0.04 0.79 0.24 0.32 0.31 0.28 -0.12 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.10 
TA_ETR C -0.09 0.04 -0.39 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.26 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.04 
TA Factor D 0.48 0.69 -0.52 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.53 -0.23 -0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.08 -0.04 0.13 
PC_Director E 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.06 
PC_Contribution F 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.23 0.23 0.48 0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.09 
PC_Lobby G 0.02 0.31 0.04 0.21 0.25 0.48 0.07 -0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
ROA G 0.27 0.34 -0.37 0.52 0.07 0.12 0.09 -0.46 -0.13 -0.36 0.05 0.03 -0.23 0.16 
Std. Dev. of ROA I -0.09 -0.19 0.23 -0.26 -0.09 -0.18 -0.12 -0.35 0.07 0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.24 -0.16 
Loss Carryforward J -0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.15 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.04 -0.09 
Change in Loss Carryforward K -0.10 0.05 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.27 0.11 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.15 -0.06 
Foreign Assets L 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.13 
Change in Goodwill M 0.09 0.19 -0.06 0.19 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.21 -0.19 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.39 0.00 
New Investments N -0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.21 0.10 
Property, Plant, and Equipment O 0.03 0.11 -0.12 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.21 -0.27 -0.11 -0.05 -0.12 -0.03 -0.04 
Intangible Assets P 0.15 0.13 -0.05 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.10 -0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.14 0.50 0.01 -0.18 
Equity Income in Earnings Q 0.00 0.16 -0.03 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.13 -0.16 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.10 
Abnormal Accruals E -0.08 -0.06 0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.19 0.33 0.04 0.06 -0.08 -0.13 0.06 -0.14 
Cash Holdings S -0.03 -0.01 0.13 -0.08 -0.05 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 0.36 0.07 0.04 0.15 -0.05 0.33 -0.38 
Firm Size T 0.07 0.60 -0.05 0.45 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.43 -0.32 0.00 -0.06 0.28 0.29 0.14 0.18 
Leverage U 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.11 -0.01 -0.28 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.10 -0.15 0.41 
Market-to-Book V 0.00 0.23 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.32 -0.03 
No. of Business Segments W 0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.09 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.13 -0.06 0.07 
No. of Geographic Segments X 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.83 0.17 0.09 -0.07 
Governance Index Y 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.05 
Institutional Ownership Z 0.04 0.22 -0.13 0.22 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.29 -0.25 0.03 -0.06 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.07 
Dual Class AA -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.13 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.05 
Government Contracts AB 0.05 0.23 -0.02 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.12 -0.19 0.05 -0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 -0.07 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index AC -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.11 
Industry % of Connected Firms AD 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.06 
Distance from Firm HQ to DC AE 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.07 
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Variables ID P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE 
DTAX A 0.11 0.01 -0.21 -0.09 0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 
SHELTER B 0.11 0.10 -0.04 -0.01 0.63 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.28 -0.01 0.07 0.03 
TA_ETR C -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
TA Factor D 0.15 0.09 -0.17 -0.09 0.53 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.24 -0.01 0.06 0.02 
PC_Director E 0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.29 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.12 -0.04 
PC_Contribution F 0.05 0.10 -0.10 -0.12 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.05 0.13 0.00 
PC_Lobby G 0.10 0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.38 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.33 0.07 0.18 -0.01 
ROA G 0.05 0.13 -0.34 -0.22 0.35 0.04 -0.14 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Std. Dev. of ROA I -0.02 -0.10 0.38 0.37 -0.21 -0.19 0.21 -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 
Loss Carryforward J 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 
Change in Loss Carryforward K 0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 0.12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 
Foreign Assets L 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.24 -0.08 0.02 0.05 0.71 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 
Change in Goodwill M 0.57 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 
New Investments N 0.18 -0.03 0.18 0.36 0.06 -0.03 0.24 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 
Property, Plant, and Equipment O -0.19 0.07 -0.09 -0.28 0.14 0.37 -0.06 0.00 -0.11 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.03 
Intangible Assets P -0.01 -0.04 -0.14 0.20 0.18 -0.03 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.14 -0.01 0.13 -0.04 
Equity Income in Earnings Q 0.05 -0.05 -0.08 0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.00 
Abnormal Accruals E -0.15 -0.07 0.20 -0.21 -0.12 0.14 -0.08 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 
Cash Holdings S -0.17 -0.11 0.13 0.00 -0.34 0.28 -0.15 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 
Firm Size T 0.26 0.15 -0.24 0.01 0.13 0.23 0.18 0.30 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.34 -0.03 0.13 0.05 
Leverage U 0.20 0.10 -0.14 -0.52 0.19 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.00 
Market-to-Book V 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.43 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 
No. of Business Segments W 0.17 0.06 -0.08 -0.14 0.17 0.13 -0.04 0.22 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.02 
No. of Geographic Segments X 0.15 0.07 -0.10 0.08 0.30 -0.01 0.07 0.21 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.01 -0.06 0.08 
Governance Index Y 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.13 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.04 
Institutional Ownership Z 0.19 0.09 -0.19 -0.01 0.54 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 
Dual Class AA 0.08 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.12 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.02 
Government Contracts AB 0.23 0.08 -0.12 -0.05 0.31 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.20 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.08 0.09 -0.03 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index AC -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.14 -0.02 0.10 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.24 -0.04 
Industry % of Connected Firms AD 0.16 0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.14 -0.01 
Distance from Firm HQ to DC AE -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
42 
 
TABLE 4 
First-stage probit model: Determinants of corporate political activity 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pred. Sign PC_Director PC_Contribution PC_Lobby 
     
ROA ? -0.382*** -0.542*** -0.747*** 
  (-6.74) (-4.70) (-12.53) 
Std. Dev. of ROA ? 0.131 -0.424** 0.138 
  (1.46) (-2.21) (1.47) 
Loss Carry Forward ? -0.076*** -0.042 0.006 
  (-3.79) (-1.56) (0.29) 
Change in Loss Carry Forward ? -0.031 -0.223 -0.051 
  (-0.54) (-1.51) (-0.87) 
Foreign Assets ? -0.188*** -0.390*** -0.438*** 
  (-3.74) (-5.56) (-8.28) 
Change in Goodwill ? 0.424** 0.784*** 0.479*** 
  (2.43) (3.15) (2.76) 
New Investments ? -0.180** -0.243** -0.292*** 
  (-2.41) (-1.99) (-3.73) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment ? -0.059 0.149** -0.101* 
  (-1.23) (2.19) (-1.95) 
Intangible Assets ? -0.458*** -0.622*** -0.173*** 
  (-7.33) (-6.99) (-2.74) 
Equity Income in Earnings ? 0.119 13.366*** 8.252*** 
  (0.06) (5.35) (3.96) 
Abnormal Accruals ? 0.233* -0.420* -0.082 
  (1.79) (-1.80) (-0.59) 
Cash Holdings ? -0.144*** -0.757*** -0.116** 
  (-3.17) (-8.18) (-2.44) 
Firm Size + 0.217*** 0.355*** 0.296*** 
  (34.69) (40.88) (45.91) 
Leverage + 0.466*** 0.617*** 0.140** 
  (7.15) (6.60) (2.03) 
Market-to-Book ? -0.004 -0.016*** -0.009*** 
  (-1.22) (-3.53) (-3.01) 
No. of Business Segments + 0.032** 0.034* 0.018 
  (2.02) (1.70) (1.11) 
No. of Geographic Segments + 0.026 0.090*** 0.076*** 
  (1.36) (3.46) (3.82) 
Governance Index ? -0.003 0.061*** 0.030*** 
  (-0.53) (10.10) (5.78) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.102*** 0.004 0.001 
  (-3.16) (0.59) (0.10) 
Dual Class ? 0.064** -0.047 0.013 
  (2.13) (-1.20) (0.42) 
Government Contracts + 0.126*** 0.160*** 0.173*** 
  (17.50) (19.73) (23.12) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index + 0.666*** 0.129 0.455*** 
  (4.40) (0.60) (2.87) 
Industry % of Connected Firms + 1.288*** 2.556*** 2.847*** 
  (6.92) (10.62) (14.65) 
Distance from Firm HQ to DC - -0.072*** -0.048*** -0.032*** 
  (-6.96) (-3.44) (-2.98) 
Constant  -2.620*** -4.818*** -3.554*** 
  (-15.12) (-20.12) (-21.45) 
     
Industry Indicators  YES YES YES 
Year Indicators  YES YES YES 
Observations  32,898 32,898 32,898 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.152 0.345 0.242 
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Area under ROC Curve  0.767 0.901 0.831 
Notes: 
The sample period is from 1999 to 2009. The Z-statistics (two-tailed test) are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Second-stage regressions: Corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness 
 
Panel A: Politicians as directors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pred. 
Sign 
 
DTAX 
 
SHELTER 
 
TA_ETR 
 
TA Factor 
      
PC_Director + 0.082*** 0.111*** 0.147*** 0.474*** 
  (5.14) (3.89) (5.98) (10.39) 
ROA + 0.390*** 0.032*** -0.227*** 0.574*** 
  (26.24) (25.33) (-21.86) (43.01) 
Std. Dev. of ROA ? 0.073*** -0.001 0.080*** 0.030** 
  (6.96) (-0.97) (4.27) (2.06) 
Loss Carry Forward ? 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 
  (7.09) (4.56) (6.23) (2.66) 
Change in Loss Carry Forward ? -0.011 0.030*** 0.009 0.186*** 
  (-1.24) (26.44) (1.26) (11.80) 
Foreign Assets + 0.019*** 0.002*** 0.051*** 0.029*** 
  (4.45) (4.64) (5.71) (3.11) 
Change in Goodwill ? -0.075*** 0.000 0.098*** -0.059** 
  (-4.06) (0.31) (3.61) (-2.02) 
New Investments ? -0.034*** 0.002** -0.052*** 0.014 
  (-3.45) (2.43) (-4.75) (0.83) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment ? 0.014*** -0.000 0.009 0.019** 
  (2.66) (-0.80) (1.09) (2.32) 
Intangible Assets ? 0.106*** -0.001** -0.024** 0.112*** 
  (7.20) (-2.42) (-2.06) (8.76) 
Equity Income in Earnings ? -1.687*** 0.031** 0.253 -0.785*** 
  (-8.41) (1.96) (0.95) (-2.73) 
Abnormal Accruals + -0.096*** 0.031*** 0.035* 0.154*** 
  (-4.69) (21.35) (1.69) (4.60) 
Cash Holdings - 0.037*** -0.000 0.051*** 0.000 
  (6.09) (-1.12) (7.88) (0.07) 
Firm Size ? -0.013*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.020*** 
  (-11.21) (23.56) (2.20) (5.46) 
Leverage + 0.028*** 0.001 0.036*** -0.092*** 
  (4.76) (1.07) (3.15) (-8.78) 
Market-to-Book ? 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001** -0.002** 
  (0.78) (-9.55) (2.30) (-2.45) 
No. of Business Segments + 0.004** 0.000 -0.006** 0.001 
  (2.47) (1.54) (-2.44) (0.29) 
No. of Geographic Segments + -0.003 0.000 -0.008** -0.000 
  (-1.33) (1.07) (-2.32) (-0.12) 
Governance Index ? 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001* 0.006*** 
  (2.83) (3.81) (1.82) (5.66) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.001 -0.001*** -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.32) (-4.65) (-1.33) (-1.19) 
Dual Class - -0.008*** 0.000 -0.006 -0.010* 
  (-4.43) (0.42) (-1.32) (-1.94) 
Government Contracts - -0.001 -0.000 -0.004** -0.006*** 
  (-1.27) (-0.17) (-2.42) (-2.98) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ? -0.068*** -0.003** 0.019 -0.185*** 
  (-3.47) (-2.01) (0.86) (-6.50) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ? -0.041*** -0.004*** -0.074*** -0.243*** 
  (-4.60) (-3.35) (-5.30) (-10.20) 
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Observations  32,898 32,898 30,376 30,376 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Squared  0.308 0.724 0.100 0.465 
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Panel B: Corporate campaign contributions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pred. 
Sign 
 
DTAX 
 
SHELTER 
 
TA_ETR 
 
TA Factor 
      
PC_Contribution + 0.093*** 0.363*** 0.104*** 0.518*** 
  (7.93) (7.75) (6.54) (17.82) 
ROA + 0.390*** 0.038*** -0.231*** 0.577*** 
  (27.85) (25.74) (-23.02) (43.24) 
Std. Dev. of ROA ? 0.075*** -0.001 0.083*** 0.041*** 
  (6.99) (-0.79) (4.34) (3.21) 
Loss Carry Forward ? 0.014*** 0.001*** 0.025*** 0.004 
  (6.47) (4.27) (5.67) (1.18) 
Change in Loss Carry Forward ? -0.011 0.036*** 0.008 0.185*** 
  (-1.27) (26.56) (1.18) (11.90) 
Foreign Assets + 0.020*** 0.003*** 0.050*** 0.032*** 
  (4.50) (5.31) (5.46) (3.71) 
Change in Goodwill ? -0.075*** 0.000 0.102*** -0.060* 
  (-4.06) (0.24) (3.69) (-1.95) 
New Investments ? -0.034*** 0.002** -0.055*** 0.014 
  (-3.33) (2.54) (-5.04) (0.83) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment ? 0.010* -0.001* 0.004 -0.002 
  (1.91) (-1.95) (0.51) (-0.23) 
Intangible Assets ? 0.105*** -0.002** -0.030** 0.105*** 
  (7.40) (-2.50) (-2.50) (8.29) 
Equity Income in Earnings ? -1.891*** -0.001 0.064 -1.932*** 
  (-9.71) (-0.04) (0.24) (-6.30) 
Abnormal Accruals + -0.091*** 0.038*** 0.044** 0.187*** 
  (-4.44) (22.11) (2.21) (5.88) 
Cash Holdings - 0.040*** -0.000 0.052*** 0.014* 
  (6.63) (-0.33) (7.90) (1.85) 
Firm Size ? -0.013*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.019*** 
  (-14.69) (24.78) (3.91) (7.13) 
Leverage + 0.031*** 0.000 0.044*** -0.073*** 
  (5.35) (0.41) (3.91) (-6.67) 
Market-to-Book ? 0.000 -0.001*** 0.002** -0.001 
  (1.12) (-9.58) (2.53) (-1.39) 
No. of Business Segments + 0.004*** 0.000 -0.005** 0.002 
  (2.58) (1.49) (-2.22) (0.87) 
No. of Geographic Segments + -0.003 0.000 -0.008** -0.000 
  (-1.33) (1.02) (-2.27) (-0.14) 
Governance Index ? -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  (-0.90) (-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.86) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.44) (-5.23) (-1.38) (-1.36) 
Dual Class - -0.006*** 0.001 -0.003 0.003 
  (-3.43) (1.45) (-0.66) (0.49) 
Government Contracts - -0.002** -0.000* -0.003** -0.012*** 
  (-2.32) (-1.67) (-2.03) (-6.83) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ? -0.061*** -0.004** 0.039* -0.145*** 
  (-3.32) (-2.11) (1.81) (-5.55) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ? -0.048*** -0.007*** -0.059*** -0.263*** 
  (-6.98) (-7.03) (-6.39) (-18.08) 
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Observations  32,898 32,898 30,376 30,376 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Squared  0.308 0.724 0.100 0.480 
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Panel C: Corporate lobbying activities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pred. 
Sign 
 
DTAX 
 
SHELTER 
 
TA_ETR 
 
TA Factor 
      
PC_Lobby + 0.069*** 0.120*** 0.102*** 0.483*** 
  (5.87) (5.73) (5.70) (17.49) 
ROA + 0.392*** 0.034*** -0.226*** 0.598*** 
  (28.10) (26.01) (-22.81) (43.76) 
Std. Dev. of ROA ? 0.073*** -0.001 0.081*** 0.030** 
  (6.94) (-1.08) (4.29) (2.17) 
Loss Carry Forward ? 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.025*** -0.000 
  (6.23) (3.79) (5.46) (-0.09) 
Change in Loss Carry Forward ? -0.011 0.032*** 0.009 0.188*** 
  (-1.24) (26.71) (1.27) (12.03) 
Foreign Assets + 0.021*** 0.003*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 
  (4.50) (5.54) (5.87) (4.80) 
Change in Goodwill ? -0.074*** 0.001 0.102*** -0.059* 
  (-3.96) (0.54) (3.70) (-1.88) 
New Investments ? -0.033*** 0.002*** -0.051*** 0.029 
  (-3.15) (2.77) (-4.62) (1.64) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment ? 0.014*** -0.000 0.008 0.017** 
  (2.59) (-0.67) (0.99) (2.13) 
Intangible Assets ? 0.101*** -0.002*** -0.035*** 0.080*** 
  (6.95) (-4.00) (-2.95) (6.61) 
Equity Income in Earnings ? -1.793*** 0.015 0.119 -1.597*** 
  (-9.29) (0.88) (0.43) (-5.52) 
Abnormal Accruals + -0.092*** 0.033*** 0.042** 0.177*** 
  (-4.46) (21.94) (2.13) (5.25) 
Cash Holdings - 0.036*** -0.001 0.049*** -0.001 
  (6.06) (-1.20) (7.60) (-0.17) 
Firm Size ? -0.013*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.013*** 
  (-11.54) (22.53) (2.58) (6.00) 
Leverage + 0.033*** 0.001** 0.045*** -0.067*** 
  (5.54) (2.03) (3.98) (-6.06) 
Market-to-Book ? 0.000 -0.001*** 0.002** -0.001 
  (0.99) (-9.58) (2.50) (-1.51) 
No. of Business Segments + 0.004*** 0.000* -0.005** 0.002 
  (2.59) (1.69) (-2.19) (0.88) 
No. of Geographic Segments + -0.003 0.000 -0.008** -0.003 
  (-1.49) (0.78) (-2.45) (-0.89) 
Governance Index ? 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.49) (1.45) (0.39) (1.08) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.001 -0.001*** -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.32) (-5.29) (-1.33) (-1.20) 
Dual Class - -0.008*** 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 
  (-4.02) (0.78) (-1.00) (-1.11) 
Government Contracts - -0.002* -0.000* -0.004** -0.015*** 
  (-1.74) (-1.75) (-2.40) (-7.44) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ? -0.067*** -0.004** 0.027 -0.198*** 
  (-3.43) (-2.46) (1.32) (-6.28) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ? -0.035*** -0.005*** -0.051*** -0.253*** 
  (-5.01) (-5.03) (-5.07) (-17.67) 
      
Observations  32,898 32,898 30,376 30,376 
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Adjusted/Pseudo R-Squared  0.308 0.724 0.100 0.474 
 
Notes: 
The sample period is from 1999 to 2009. All regressions also include industry and fiscal year indicators. The two-
tailed test t-statistics (Z-statistics) in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and year. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 6 
The addition of politically connected directors and tax aggressiveness 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pred. 
Sign 
 
DTAX 
 
SHELTER 
 
TA_ETR 
 
TA Factor 
      
POST_ADD + 0.031** 0.201*** 0.044** 0.116*** 
  (2.08) (7.25) (2.06) (5.64) 
ROA + 0.467*** 0.538*** -0.057*** 0.673*** 
  (60.56) (37.02) (-4.91) (60.84) 
Std. Dev. of ROA ? 0.076*** 0.044* 0.086*** 0.042** 
  (6.13) (1.87) (4.57) (2.34) 
Loss Carry Forward ? 0.009*** 0.005 0.025*** -0.000 
  (3.03) (0.81) (5.68) (-0.11) 
Change in Loss Carry Forward ? -0.006 0.451*** 0.019** 0.236*** 
  (-1.03) (41.91) (2.22) (28.92) 
Foreign Assets + 0.002 0.017 0.037*** -0.006 
  (0.25) (0.98) (2.77) (-0.44) 
Change in Goodwill ? -0.081*** 0.063* 0.088*** -0.052* 
  (-4.02) (1.66) (2.96) (-1.81) 
New Investments ? -0.055*** 0.032* -0.036** -0.008 
  (-5.74) (1.74) (-2.54) (-0.59) 
Property, Plant, and Equipment ? 0.030*** 0.093*** 0.015 0.054*** 
  (2.74) (4.59) (0.96) (3.58) 
Intangible Assets ? 0.131*** 0.129*** -0.001 0.166*** 
  (13.05) (6.81) (-0.05) (11.60) 
Equity Income in Earnings ? -1.674*** 0.531 0.650 -1.121*** 
  (-6.02) (1.01) (1.60) (-2.88) 
Abnormal Accruals + -0.071*** 0.526*** 0.044** 0.216*** 
  (-5.17) (20.41) (2.21) (11.22) 
Cash Holdings - 0.023*** 0.102*** 0.026*** 0.058*** 
  (3.97) (9.20) (3.02) (6.89) 
Firm Size ? -0.016*** 0.014*** -0.026*** 0.004 
  (-9.13) (4.10) (-9.92) (1.58) 
Leverage + 0.040*** -0.211*** 0.020 -0.083*** 
  (3.56) (-10.00) (1.21) (-5.26) 
Market-to-Book ? 0.002*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.001 
  (4.04) (-1.22) (5.37) (-1.23) 
No. of Business Segments + 0.000 0.005 -0.004 0.004 
  (0.06) (0.77) (-0.90) (0.80) 
No. of Geographic Segments + 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.003 
  (0.55) (1.01) (0.74) (0.59) 
Governance Index ? -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.91) (-0.57) (0.59) (-0.75) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.30) (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.46) 
Government Contracts ? -0.005** -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
  (-2.48) (-0.49) (-1.10) (-1.35) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ? 0.027 0.012 0.246** -0.081 
  (0.41) (0.09) (2.52) (-0.87) 
      
Firm Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  17,988 17,988 17,234 17,234 
Number of Firms  2,038 2,038 2,030 2,030 
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Adjusted R-Squared  0.130 0.122 -0.110 0.177 
 
Notes: 
The sample period is from 1999 to 2009. The variable POST_ADD is the interaction term between POST and ADD, 
ADD is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms that experience the appointment of politically 
connected directors and zero otherwise, and POST takes the value of one for ADD firms for the period after the 
appointment year and zero otherwise. The indicators ADD and Dual Class are omitted from the regression because 
of the inclusion of firm fixed effects. The two-tailed test t-statistics (Z-statistics) in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by both firm and year. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 7 
Corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness: FIN48 UTB 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES lnUTB SC_UTB PRED_UTB 
 
Panel A: Politicians as directors 
PC_Director 2.719*** 0.015 0.003*** 
 (6.56) (1.31) (2.77) 
    
Observations 4,426 4,426 32,898 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.673 0.012 0.556 
 
Panel B: Corporate campaign contributions 
PC_Contribution 2.769*** 0.026* 0.008*** 
 (6.95) (1.81) (9.23) 
    
Observations 4,426 4,426 32,898 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.674 0.012 0.560 
 
Panel C: Corporate lobbying activities 
PC_Lobby 2.757*** 0.014* 0.005*** 
 (7.08) (1.86) (6.39) 
    
Observations 4,426 4,426 32,898 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.672 0.012 0.558 
    
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Industry and Year Indicators YES YES YES 
 
Notes: 
The sample period is from 2007 to 2009 for Models (1) and (2) and from 1999 to 2009 for Model (3). The same set 
of control variables as in Table 5 is included in all the regressions but not reported here for brevity. The two-tailed 
test t-statistics (Z-statistics) in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and year. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 8 
Corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness: Politically connected sample 
 
Panel A: Freshness of director’s political position 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DTAX SHELTER TA_ETR TA Factor 
     
Director_Freshness 0.023** -0.009 -0.029 0.017 
 (2.56) (-0.10) (-1.36) (0.67) 
     
Observations 4,433 4,433 4,192 4,192 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.272 0.721 0.094 0.549 
 
 
Panel B: Number of contribution-supported candidates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DTAX SHELTER TA_ETR TA Factor 
     
PICandidates 0.001 0.047*** 0.005 0.008 
 (0.78) (4.91) (1.24) (1.44) 
     
Observations 2,593 2,593 2,517 2,517 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.130 0.714 0.108 0.498 
 
 
Panel C: Candidate-contributing firm relationship strength  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DTAX SHELTER TA_ETR TA Factor 
     
PIStrength 0.001 0.026*** 0.001 0.005 
 (0.83) (3.84) (0.54) (1.11) 
     
Observations 2,447 2,447 2,377 2,377 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.134 0.709 0.110 0.500 
 
 
Panel D: Ability of contribution-supported candidates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DTAX SHELTER TA_ETR TA Factor 
     
PIAbility -0.003 -0.009 0.011* -0.020** 
 (-0.82) (-0.96) (1.86) (-2.26) 
     
Observations 2,125 2,125 2,073 2,073 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.136 0.694 0.120 0.491 
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Panel E: Power of contribution-supported candidates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DTAX SHELTER TA_ETR TA Factor 
     
PIPower 0.000 0.023*** 0.002 0.008* 
 (0.17) (3.11) (0.47) (1.90) 
     
Observations 2,438 2,438 2,369 2,369 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.135 0.706 0.110 0.500 
 
 
Panel F: Total lobbying expenses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DTAX SHELTER TA_ETR TA Factor 
     
Lobby Amount 0.004*** 0.054*** 0.003 0.007** 
 (4.39) (4.60) (1.33) (2.35) 
     
Observations 4,896 4,896 4,650 4,650 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.268 0.715 0.096 0.546 
 
 
Panel G: Number of types of connections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DTAX SHELTER TA_ETR TA Factor 
     
PC_3 0.052*** 0.472*** 0.036 0.226*** 
 (2.63) (6.72) (1.15) (6.62) 
PC_2 0.028*** 0.259*** 0.013 0.131*** 
 (2.56) (6.63) (0.75) (6.92) 
     
Observations 8,208 8,208 7,761 7,761 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.277 0.577 0.098 0.542 
 
Notes: 
The sample period is from 1999 to 2009. The same set of control variables as in Table 5 is included in all the 
regressions but not reported here for brevity. The two-tailed test t-statistics (Z-statistics) in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by both firm and year. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
